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CONTROL PROVISIONS OF THE SOUTH
CAROLINA CODE: CORPORATIONS VERSUS
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
I. INTRODUCTION
The limited liability company (LLC) has emerged as one of the most
popular forms of business organization since its introduction in 1977.' In 1996,
South Carolina adopted the South Carolina Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act (the LLC Act), becoming one of the first four states to derive
legislation from the then newly approved Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act.2 Compared to the South Carolina Corporate Code (the Corporate Code),
however, the LLC Act provides little protection to minority investors. When
advising a client to organize as either a corporation or an LLC, a lawyer must
consider the differing statutory protections afforded minority shareholders and
minority LLC members.
The Corporate Code protects minority and nonvoting investors through
statutory rights designed to prevent those owning a majority interest in a
corporation from overrunning the participatory rights of minority and
nonvoting shareholders. These control rights are generally well-defined by
statute, and most of these Corporate Code provisions are mandatory. In
comparison, the LLC Act provides relatively few statutory control rights in
favor of minority and nonvoting LLC members. Further, almost every potential
control right under the LLC Act is amendable or avoidable by an LLC's
operating agreement, which governs relations between and among an LLC and
its members. The operating agreementbetween LLC members is really the key
source of control.
Comparing the control rights afforded by the Corporate Code and the LLC
Act better equips attorneys to counsel clients about forming the most suitable
business entity. A comparison also serves to point out control mechanisms for
which the LLC Act does not specifically provide, but which may nonetheless
be available to an LLC through its operating agreement. This Comment is
organized according to control rights given to minority and nonvoting corporate
shareholders under the Corporate Code: dissenter's rightsjudicial dissolution,
preemptive rights, transferee voting rights, statutory voting rights for nonvoting
1. See generally 1 LARRYE. RIBSTEIN &ROBERTR. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1.06 (1996) (recounting the history of LLC legislation).
2. Id. § 1.08, at 7 (Supp. 1996).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-103(a) (West Supp. 1998).
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shares, and shareholder voting rights.4 Each section will compare the respective
corporate control provision with the comparable sections of the LLC Act.
II. DiscussioN
A. Entity Control
1. The Corporate Context
A corporation generally operates under the direction of its annually elected
board of directors.5 Shareholders elect members to the board by a majority
vote, vesting power to control the board's composition in those shareholders
who control a majority of the outstanding voting shares.6 Because the board
conducts business by a majority vote of the directors, and because directors
typically vote under the influence of their constituent shareholders, majority
shareholders essentially govern corporate affairs.7 Although in some
transactions the board may not act without shareholder approval, shareholder
approval requires only a majority vote, which negates the value of a
shareholder vote for minority shareholders.' Majority shareholders thus have
the opportunity to "further their own interests to the detriment of minority
shareholders."9
4. Although not a control provision per se, fiduciary duties imposed on the management
of both corporations and LLCs help protect minority investors. See generally id. § 33-8-300
(Law. Co-op. 1976) (prescribing general standards for directors); id. § 33-44-409 (West Supp.
1998) (defining fiduciary duties of LLC members and managers). Fiduciary duties can be
especially important in the LLC context because the operating agreement is powerless to
eliminate management's fiduciary duties. Id. § 33-44-103(b)(2)-(4).
5. Id. § 33-8-101(c), -103(d) (Law. Co-op. 1990); 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B.
THOMPSON, O'NEAL's OPPRESSIONOFMINORITYSHAREHOLDERS § 1:02, at 3 (2d ed. 1997) ("The
directors determine corporate policies, select corporate officers and sometimes key employees,
and supervise the normal operation of the corporation."). The board usually appoints officers to
run the corporation's daily operations. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-400(a) (allowing
directors to appoint officers); id. § 33-8-410 (setting the duties of officers).
6. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 5, § 1:02, at 3. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-280(a)
(Law. Co-op. 1976).
7. O'NEAL&THOMPSON, supra note 5, § 1:02, at 3. O'Neal refers to this proposition as the
"principle of majority rule." Id. In the close corporation context, majority shareholders achieve
the same result by simply electing themselves to the board. Id.
8. Many transactions require a two-thirds shareholder vote, but a corporation can usually
reduce this to a majority vote. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-10-103(0-(g) (Law. Co-op. 1976)
(governing the amendment of the articles of incorporation); id. § 33-11-103(e)-(f) (governing
mergers and share exchanges); id. § 33-12-102(e)-(f) (governing sales of all, or substantially all,
of a corporation's assets not made in the ordinary course of business). If a corporation requires
only a majority vote, then majority shareholders can approve the transaction despite minority
disapproval. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 5, § 1:02, at 3.
9. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 5, § 1:02, at 3.
Vol. 51: 721
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2. The LLC Context
The principle of majority rule can similarly arise in the LLC context.
Under the LLC Act, LLC members can choose to be either manager-managed
or member-managed.'0 Manager-managed LLCs are similar in governance to
corporations because members elect managers by a majority vote to conduct
the company's business." The LLC Act apportions voting rights equally among
LLC members.' 2 However, the operating agreement affords members
considerable latitude to either modify or opt out of almost any provision in the
LLC Act.'3 As a result, the operating agreement could distribute voting power
in proportion to capital contributions, or in any other manner, thereby
allocating to certain members a controlling authority to appoint a majority of
the mangers and subject the LLC to the principle of majority rule. 4
In a member-managed LLC, each member has equal managerial voting
rights. 5 But if a group of members typically votes together, outvoting the
remaining members, then the majority vote will control the LLC. Additionally,
a member-managed LLC's operating agreement may modify the default voting
apportionment, exposing the LLC to the principle of majority rule in the same
fashion as a manager-managed LLC.
B. Dissenter's Rights
1. The Corporate Context
A corporation generally conducts business through its board of directors,
to which the Corporate Code grants the authority to act in normal business
affairs without shareholder consent. 6 However, the Corporate Code does not
permit the board to act unilaterally in certain major transactions. Instead, the
Corporate Code requires the board to first obtain shareholder approval. 7 The
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-203(6) (West Supp. 1998).
11. See id. § 33-44-404(b)(3)(i).
12. Id. § 33-44-404(a)(1), (b)(3)(i).
13. Id. § 33-44-103, cmt. The flexibility to override default minority control provisions
may be an attractive characteristic to investors. See JOHN M. CUNNINGHAM, DRAFTING LIMITED
LIABILITYCOMPANYOPERATINGAGREEMENTS § 2.02(1999); 1 RIBSTEIN&KEATINGE, supra note
1, § 8.15, at 8-33.
14. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 13, § 3.06, at 3-10 (surmising that the majority of LLCs
probably allocate voting power according to capital contributions).
15. Id. § 33-44-404(1).
16. Id. §§ 33-8-101(c), -103(d) (Law. Co-op. 1976); see also I O'NEAL & THOMPSON,
supra note5, § 1:02, at 3 (noting that the board typically acts by a majority vote of the directors).
A shareholder's participation in ordinary business transactions is thus limited to choosing
directors to run the corporation.
17. Major transactions in which the board must seek shareholder approval include
amendments to the articles of incorporation, mergers and share exchanges, and substantial
dispositions of corporate assets not made in the ordinary course of business. S.C. CODE ANN.
2000
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principle of majority rule nullifies the practical value of minority shareholders
participating in a shareholder vote because the Corporate Code demands only
a favorable majority vote.'
To protect a minority shareholder from forced participation in an
investment that is fundamentally altered by a particular transaction, and to
ensure that the majority cannot force minority shareholders to sell their interest
at an unfairly low price, the Corporate Code provides dissenter's rights, which
entitle a shareholder to dissent from the approval of a transaction and demand
that the corporation purchase the shareholder's shares for a fair value. 9 A
shareholder may dissent from the following transactions: mergers, share
exchanges, control share acquisitions, substantial dispositions of corporate
assets not made in the ordinary course of business, amendments to the articles
of incorporation, and any other transaction in which a corporation allows its
shareholders to dissent and demand fair value.2"
a. Share Exchanges, Mergers, and Control Share Acquisitions
A shareholder entitled to vote on a proposed plan of share exchange or
mergermay dissent and receive fairvalue for his orher interest upon the plan's
approval.2' To consummate a plan of share exchange, only shareholders of a
corporation whose shares will be acquired in the share exchange may vote on
the proposed transaction; shareholders of the acquiring corporation have no
statutory right to vote on the transaction?2
In the context of mergers, shareholders of the corporation that will
§§ 33-10-103(f), -11-103(e), -12-102(e) (Law. co-op. 1976).
18. Id. §§ 33-10-103(g), -11-103(0, -12-102(0. Because directors usually vote under the
influence of their majority constituents, a majority shareholder vote should theoretically yield
the same result as a director vote. See I O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 5, § 1:02, at 3.
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-102(A) (West Supp. 1998); see MODELBUs. CoRP. AcrANN.
§ 13.01, at 13-3 (3d ed. Supp. 1997) ("On one hand, the majority is given an almost unlimited
power to change the nature and shape of the enterprise and the rights of its members. On the
other hand, the members who dissent from these changes are given a right to withdraw their
investment at fair value.").
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-102(A) (West Supp. 1998). Codified dissenter's rights are
unavailable for shares either listed on a national securities exchange or designated by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., as a national market system security. Id. § 33-
13-102(B).
21. Id. § 33-13-102(A)(1)-(2). A share exchange is a corporate combination mechanism
throughwhich a corporation can acquire all of one ormore classes of another corporation's stock
in exchange for cash or other consideration. Id. § 33-11-102(a), cmt. (Law. co-op. 1976).
Execution requirements formergers and share exchanges are almost identical. See id. §§ 33-11-
102(a), -103, cmt.
22. Id. § 33-11-103(a), cmt. 1. See also Hite v. Thomas & Howard Co., 305 S.C. 358,363,
409 S.E.2d 340,343 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Huntley v. Young, 319 S.C. 559,462
S.E.2d 860 (1995) (holding plaintiff minority shareholder not entitled to dissenter's rights upon
approval of a share exchange in part because plaintiff owned stock in the acquiring company).
Shareholders of the acquired company must approve the plan by at least a majority vote. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-11-103(f) (Law. co-op. 1976).
Vol. 51: 721
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disappear as a result of the merger must always vote to approve the plan of
merger. In contrast, shareholders of the surviving corporation may not vote
on a merger proposal for the following reasons: (1) if the corporation's articles
of incorporation will not change (except for minor "housekeeping" alterations);
(2) the number of outstanding voting and participating shares of the corporation
will not increase by more than twenty percent; (3) and each shareholder"whose
shares were outstanding immediately before the effective date of the merger
will hold the same number of shares, with identical designations, preferences,
limitations, and relative rights [after the merger]."'24 A merger within the above
parameters prompts no dissenter's rights because the merger does not "alter the
investors' prospects any more than many other management decisions."'
The Corporate Code also grants dissenter's rights in connection with
parent/subsidiary mergers.26 A parent corporation does not need approval from
eitherparent corporation shareholders or subsidiary shareholders when merging
a subsidiary into the parent corporation.27 However, the Corporate Code entitles
nonassenting subsidiary shareholders to dissent and demand fair value fromthe
parent corporation.2" Likewise, if a parent merges itself into its subsidiary, the
subsidiary shareholders may not vote on the transaction, but both parent and
subsidiary shareholders may dissent.29
Dissenter's rights are also available in the context of control share
acquisitions. In a control share acquisition, a party acquires enough shares of
a corporation to control at least one-fifthf of the outstanding voting power.3 ° The
Corporate Code entitles shareholders of a corporation other than a public
corporation to dissent from the approval of a control share acquisition.3"
23. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 33-11-103(a), cmt. 1, -13-102 cmt. 1(1) (Law. co-op. 1976) ("The
right to vote on a merger under section [33-11-103] extends to corporations whose separate
existence disappears in the merger .... "). Shareholders must approve the plan by at least a
majority vote. Id. § 33-11-103(f).
24. Id. § 33-11-103(h). See also id. § 33-10-102, cmt. (allowing board to make
"housekeeping" amendments without shareholder consent). The twentypercentrule applies only
if the corporation has authorized enough shares in its articles of incorporation to complete the
merger. Id. § 33-11-103 cmt. 2. See also id. § 33-2-102(a)(2) (requiring the articles of
incorporation to authorize the number of shares to be issued). If the articles have not authorized
enough shares to perform the merger, then a shareholder vote is necessary to amend the articles.
Id. §§ 33-11-103 cmt. 2 (Law. Co-op. 1976), -10-103 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1998).
25. Id. § 33-11-103 cmt. 2 (Law. Co-op. 1976). However, a possible twenty percent
dilution of voting and equity participation rights without corresponding dissenter's rights is
potentially problematic for minority shareholders of the surviving corporation.
26. Id. § 33-13-102(A)(I)(ii) (West Supp. 1998).
27. Id. § 33-11-104(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
28. Id. §§ 33-11-104(a), cmt. (Law. Co-op. 1976), -13-102(A)(1)(ii) (West Supp. 1998)
(providing no voting prerequisite to dissenter's rights in parent/subsidiary mergers).
Shareholders of the parent corporation do not need dissenter's rights if the parent is merging a
subsidiary into itself because the parentcorporation survives nearly unchanged. Id. § 33-11-104
cmt. (Law. Co-op. 1976).
29. Id. §§ 33-11-108(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976), -13-102(A)(1)(ii) (West Supp. 1998).
30. Id. §§ 35-2-101, -102 (West Supp. 1998).
31. Id. § 33-13-102(A)(5).
2000
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Additionally, if a corporation adopts a resolution to accord the acquired shares
full voting rights, and if the acquired shares will control at least a majority of
the corporation's outstanding voting power, then all shareholders of the
corporation may dissent unless the articles of incorporation otherwise provide.32
b. Substantial Asset Dispositions Not Made in the Ordinary
Course ofBusiness
A shareholder entitled to vote on a sale or exchange of all, or substantially
all, of a corporation's assets not made in the ordinary course of business may
dissent from such a sale and demand fair value for their shares from the
corporation. 3" The Corporate Code rightfully excepts sales made in the ordinary
course of business because dissenter's rights are available to remedy unfairness
in forcing a minority shareholder to accept some fundamental change to the
terms under which the shareholder agreed to invest.34 Terms to which a
shareholder agreed necessarily encompass submission to board discretion in
ordinary business transactions. Thus no transaction made in the ordinary course
of business should give rise to dissenter's rights. However, excepting sales
made in the ordinary course of business gives majority shareholders a loophole
through which to circumvent dissenter's rights.35 By characterizing a major
asset disposition as within the ordinary course of a corporation's business,
majority shareholders can force the minority to either "acquiesce or initiate
litigation which may be lengthy, costly and uncertain as to outcome."36
The Corporate Code also excepts from dissenter's rights court ordered
sales and cash sales from which a corporation will distribute the proceeds
within one year.37 The Corporate Code excludes court ordered sales because
judicial review of the terms and conditions of a sale theoretically provides an
"independent appraisal of the fairness of the transaction., 38 Likewise, a
shareholder may not dissent from a cash sale from which a corporation will
distribute the proceeds within one year because such sales treat all shareholders
equally; each shareholder, whether in the majority or in the minority, should
receive cash within a relatively short period of time.39
32. Id. §§ 35-2-111 (a), -109(a). Fair value paid to a shareholder dissenting from a control
share acquisition must be at least the highest price paid per share by the acquiring party. Id. § 35-
2-111(c).
33. Id. § 33-13-102(A)(3). See id. § 33-12-102 (requiring at least a majority vote to
approve a substantial asset sale not made in the ordinary course of business). This section
expressly covers sales in dissolution to prevent a corporation from avoiding dissenter's rights
"by characterizing sales as made in the process of dissolution." Id. § 33-13-102 cmt. 1(3).
34. See supra note 20.
35. 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 5, § 5:15, at 102.
36. Id.
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-102(A)(3) (West Supp. 1998).
38. Id. § 33-13-102 cmt. 1(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
39. Id. The Corporate Code allows shareholders to dissent from sales other than for cash
to protect the minority from assuming the risk of an illiquid asset. Id.
Vol. 51: 721
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c. Amendments to the Articles of Incorporation
A corporation's board of directors generally may amend its articles of
incorporation only upon a shareholder majority vote.4° If an approved
amendment would "materially and adversely" affect a shareholder by
modifying or eliminating certain participatory rights, then a shareholder may
dissent.4' For example, a shareholder may dissent from an amendment that
alters or deletes a shareholder's preferential rights, rights of redemption, or
preemptive rights.42 A shareholder may also dissent from an amendment that
either limits or excludes the shareholder's voting rights or reduces the
shareholder's number of shares "to a fraction of a share if the fractional share
so created is to be acquired for cash."'43
d. Additional Procedural Protections
A corporation must estimate the fair value of a dissenting shareholder's
interest and pay the dissenter either (1) upon receipt of a dissenter's payment
demand or (2) upon performance of the transaction that prompted dissenter's
rights.44 To avoid a potential squeeze-out of minority shareholders at an
undervalued price, the Corporate Code permits a dissenting shareholder who
is dissatisfied with a corporation's assessment of fair value to demand
additional payment from the corporation.45 If a dissenting shareholder and a
40. Id. § 33-10-103(b)(2), (f)-(g). The board may make certain "housekeeping"
amendments without a shareholder vote. Id. § 33-10-102, cmt.
41. Id. § 33-13-102(A)(4) (West Supp. 1998). In addition, a shareholder may dissent from
an amendment through which a corporation elects to become a close corporation, and a close
corporation shareholder may dissent from an amendment terminating the corporation's close
corporation status. Id. §§ 33-18-103(b), -310(c), -102(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976). Also, a close
corporation shareholder may dissent from an amendment that would modify or delete statutory
provisions forcing a close corporation to purchase a shareholder's interest at the shareholder's
death. Id. § 33-18-140(d).
42. Id. § 33-13-102(A)(4)(i-iii) (West Supp. 1998).
43. Id. § 33-13-102(A)(4)(iv)-(v).
44. Id. § 33-13-250(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976). A shareholder planning to dissent from a
proposed transaction must first notify the corporation of the shareholder's intent to dissent, and
the shareholder must not vote in favor of the transaction. Id. § 33-13-210(b). If a corporation
authorizes a transaction from which the shareholder has announced the intent to dissent, the
shareholder must then demand fair value for the shareholder's shares on a form supplied by the
corporation. Id. §§ 33-13-220(b)(3), -230(a), (c). If a corporation refuses to purchase a
dissenter's shares, the dissenter may have an action for conversion of stock. See Hite v. Thomas
& Howard Co., 305 S.C. 358, 362,409 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1991), overruled on other grounds by
Huntley v. Young, 319 S.C. 559,462 S.E.2d 860 (1995).
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-280(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976). If a dissenter fails to notify a
corporation in writing of an additional payment demand within thirty days of receiving an
inadequate payment, then the dissenter will be unable to demand additional payment. Id. § 33-
13-280(b). O'Neal argues that statutory procedures for asserting dissenter's rights are too
complex and limit the remedy's effectiveness. 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 5, § 5:29, at
203. A dissenter theoretically can determine whether or not a corporation's calculation of fair
2000
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corporation cannot agree on the value of the dissenter's shares, the corporation
can petition for ajudicial appraisal of the dissenter's shares. 6 The corporation
must bear the expenses of litigation, and the court may charge a corporation
with the dissenter's attorney's fees for acting in bad faith.47 If a corporation
fails to commence an action for appraisal within sixty days of a dissenter's
demand for additional payment, then the corporation will be liable in full for
the demanded amount.4" The Corporate Code thus provides an economic
incentive for a corporation to quickly and fairly negotiate to purchase a
dissenter's shares.
2. The LLC Context
While the Corporate Code contains an extensive provision regarding
dissenter's rights, the LLC Act provides no such equivalent. As a default, the
approval of major transactions that would give rise to dissenter's rights in the
corporate context requires the unanimous consent of an LLC's members.49
Dissenter's rights would be unnecessary if the unanimous consent provision of
the LLC Act was mandatory because a change in the terms under which an
LLC member agreed to invest could then only come about by that member's
express consent. However, an LLC may opt out of the unanimous consent
provision through its operating agreement, leaving its minority members
unprotected in major transactions. °
The LLC Act does appear to provide a broad analog to dissenter's rights
by permitting an LLC member to dissociate from an LLC at will and force the
company to purchase the member's distributional interest." While some
authors suggest that dissenter's rights in addition to the right to dissociate at
will would be repetitious, 2 the LLC Act severely limits the effectiveness of
value is accuratebecause financial statements and an explanation ofthe corporation's calculation
must accompany the corporation's payment. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-250(b) (Law. Co-op.
1976).
46. S.C. CODEANN. § 33-13-300(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
47. Id. § 33-13-310(a), (b)(2). The court may also assess litigation costs and attorney's fees
against a dissenter who acts in bad faith. Id.
48. Id. § 33-13-300(a).
49. Id. § 33-44-404(c)(1), (3), (11)-(12) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring unanimous consent
to approve mergers, substantial asset dispositions not made in the ordinary course of business,
and amendments to either the articles of organization or the operating agreement).
50. See id. § 33-44-103(a), cmt. (allowing the operating agreement to modify nearly every
section of the LLC Act). Although a member has no right to dissent, a member may have a cause
of action for breach of fiduciary duty or oppression. Id. § 33-44-409 (setting forth fiduciary
duties of LLC management).
51. See id. § 3344-601(1), -602(a), -603(1), (2)(b).
52. See I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 11.13, at 11-29, § 11.15, at 11-49
(suggesting the redundancy of including both provisions); WALTER C. TUTHILLETAL., LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES: LEGAL ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATION, OPERATION, AMDDISSoLUTION, atA-
29 (BNA Corporate Practice Series No. 67, 1996) (suggesting that dissenter's rights are
unnecessary if members can withdraw at will).
Vol. 51: 721
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voluntary dissociation. First, an LLC's operating agreement could provide for
the purchase of a dissociating member's interest for less than fair market
value. 3 Second, the operating agreement can eliminate the power to dissociate
at will.'4 Third, the operating agreement may permit dissociation at will, but
may also provide that such dissociation at will is "wrongful," entitling an LLC
to damages against a dissociating member that will act to offset any economic
interest owing to the dissociating member.55 As a result, majority LLC
members potentially could either force a minority member to remain in an
investment fundamentally different from that which the minority member
originally contemplated, or majority members could squeeze out a minority
member by redeeming the member's interest for little consideration.
The possible results vary depending on whether an LLC opts to be an at-
will LLC or a term LLC.56 Under the LLC Act, a member of an at-will LLC
can "wrongfully" dissociate only if such dissociation violates the company's
operating agreement. If an at-will company's operating agreement neither
abolishes the right to dissociate at will nor provides that dissociation at will is
wrongful, then the LLC will be liable to a member dissociating at will for the
unabated fair value of the member's distributional interest." However, if the
operating agreement provides that a member's dissociation will cause the LLC
to dissolve, or if either the remaining members vote to dissolve the LLC or a
member's dissociation somehow renders the LLC's continued existence
unlawful, then the LLC must dissolve, and the dissociating member will
receive only that to which the member is entitled under the dissolution
provisions.5"
In contrast, a member of a term LLC can never dissociate at will without
incurring damages for wrongful dissociation unless the company's operating
53. The operating agreement may set the amount to which a dissociating member is
entitled. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-103 (West Supp. 1998).
54. Id. § 33-44-602(a).
55. Id. §§ 33-44-602(b)(1), (c), -701(0. Because the LLC Act permits dissociation in
violation of the operating agreement, but permits the operating agreement to forbid voluntary
dissociation at will, "it may not be clear if the operating agreement should be interpreted as
prohibiting withdrawal altogether or making withdrawal wrongful under certain circumstances."
1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 11.02, at 91 n.8 (Supp. 1996); see S.C. CODEANN. § 33-
44-602(a), (b)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
56. See S.C. CODEANN. § 33-44-602(b)(1) (West Supp. 1998). An at-will company differs
from a term company in that an at-will LLC is not limited to a specific duration in its articles of
organization as is a term company. Id. §§ 33-44-101(2), (19), -203(a)(5).
57. See id. §§ 33-44-603(1), -701(a)(1), (f). If an LLC fails to purchase a dissociating
member's interest, the dissociated membermay petition forjudicial dissolution of the company.
Id. § 33-44-801(4)(d).
58. See id. §§ 33-44-801(l)-(3), -603(3) (requiring LLCs to treat dissociated members like
transferees, who, under section 33-44-503(e)(2), have a right to distributions upon dissolution).
See also id. § 33-44-806 (providing that after the LLC discharges its obligations, each member
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agreement provides otherwise.59 Consequently, withdrawal at will is not
equivalent to dissenter's rights for a term company member because a term
company member will never recover the full value of the member's
distributional interest. In addition, where an at-will LLC values a dissociating
member's interest to be purchased at dissociation, a term LLC values a
dissociating member's interest at the expiration of the company's term
remaining at dissociation." The time lag between dissociation and term
expiration makes dissociation from a term LLC a risky proposition. First, if an
LLC decides to dissolve between a member's dissociation and the company's
term expiration, the dissociating member will receive only that to which the
member is entitled under the dissolution statute, which may or may not be
equivalent to the value of the member's interest on the date of dissociation.6
A term company member will receive "fair value" for the member's interest
only if the company elects to continue doing business beyond the term
specified in its articles of organization.62 If the LLC continues beyond
expiration, then the value paid to the dissociating member on what would have
been the company's expiration date arguably will be worth less to the member
than if the LLC had paid the member at dissociation.63 Because a dissociated
member has no right to participate in the management of the LLC, a dissociated
member is unable to hedge the risks of possible dissolution and asset
devaluation incurred between dissociation and the expiration of the company's
term. 64
Enforcing a member's right to receive fair value upon voluntary
dissociation is procedurally difficult for a minority LLC member. Instead of
requiring an LLC to estimate the fair value of a dissociating member's interest
and pay the member immediately upon dissociation (or the company's
expiration), the LLC Act creates a negotiation process in which an LLC makes
an offer to purchase a dissociating member's interest.65 If the parties fail to
reach a bargain within 120 days, then the dissociating member has the burden
of commencing an action to determine fair value.66 Even though a court may
assess litigation costs and attorney's fees against an LLC for acting in bad faith,
59. Id. § 33-44-602(b)(2)(i).
60. Id. § 33-44-603(2)(a), (b).
61. See id. § 33-44-603(2)(a).
62. Id. § 33-44-603(2)(b).
63. If a dissociating member receives cash on the date of dissociation, the member can
invest that principle sum and earn additional interest income. If the dissociating member is not
paid until expiration, then the member forgoes interest that could have been earned between
dissociation and expiration. Thus, money received at dissociation is worth more to a dissociating
member than the same nominal amount paid to the member at expiration.
64. See id. § 33-44-603(3) (providing that dissociating members have no management
rights). However, a dissociating member may have a cause of action against an LLC if the
management violates its fiduciary duties to the dissociated member. Id. §§ 33-44-409, -410.
65. See id. § 33-44-701(b). Negotiations are unnecessary if the operating agreement
provides the purchase terms. Id. § 33-44-701(c).
66. Id. § 33-44-701(d), (e).
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fronting initial litigation costs is expensive and may dissuade minority LLC
members from seeking judicial assistance.67 As a result, an LLC may pressure
a dissociating member to accept lower than fair value for the member's
distributional interest.
Thus, while the Corporate Code expressly protects minority shareholders
from fundamental investment changes and potential squeeze outs at an unfairly
low price, the LLC Act fails to provide comparable protection for minority
LLC members. A minority LLC member's protection against fundamental
changes and potential squeeze outs is dependent upon an LLC's operating
agreement and the willingness of majority members to bargain for dissenter's
rights.
C. Judicial Dissolution
1. The Corporate Context
A corporate shareholder may commence a proceeding to dissolve a
corporation (1) if those in control of a corporation have behaved towards a
shareholder "in a manner that is illegal, fraudulent, oppressive, or unfairly
prejudicial"; or (2) if those in control are guilty of asset misappropriation or
waste.6" A remedy in dissolution allows a minority shareholder to recoup the
shareholder's investment by forcing a corporation to liquidate and distribute its
net assets proportionally among its shareholders.6 Because dissolution is a
drastic remedy, a court may prefer to give a petitioning shareholder some form
of alternative relief.
70
Relieffrom "oppressive" conduct arguably has become the broadest source
of shareholder control under the dissolution provision. In determining what
actions are oppressive, courts often look to the reasonable expectations of a
67. See id. § 33-44-702(d) (permitting courts to assess fees against either party for acting
in bad faith).
68. Id. § 33-14-300(2)(ii), (iv) (Law. Co-op. 1976). Close corporation shareholders may
seek judicial dissolution in the same circumstances. See id. § 33-18-400(a)(1), (3).
69. See id. § 33-14-105(a)(4).
70. See id. § 33-14-310(d), (e). See also Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause
ofActionfor Oppression, 48 Bus. LAw. 699,708 (1993) ("Courts are more inclined to use these
alternative remedies."); Andrew P. Campbell, Litigating Minority Shareholder Rights and the
New Tort of Oppression, ALA. LAW., Mar. 1992, at 113 (calling the impact of dissolution
"draconian"). The Corporate Code allows courts to order alternative relief including, but not
limited to: amending or deleting any provision in or amendment to the articles of incorporation
or a corporate resolution; prohibiting a corporate or shareholder action; and compelling a
corporation to purchase a shareholder's shares for fair value. S.C. CODEANN. § 33-14-3 10(d)(l)-
(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976). The South Carolina Close Corporation Supplement provides more
specific alternatives to dissolution than does the Corporate Code. See id. § 33-18-410 (listing
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minority shareholder.7 ' For example, a close corporation may frustrate a
shareholder's reasonable expectation to share in the corporation's earnings by
refusing to pay dividends.72 Other actions that frustrate the reasonable
expectations of a shareholder include the exclusion of a minority close
corporation shareholder from participating in management and the payment of
inordinate salaries to majority shareholder employees siphoned from corporate
earnings.7 3 Oppression generally contemplates an ongoing course of conduct,
and an isolated incident may not be grounds for dissolution.74
Courts may also judge oppression by the same standards used to determine
whether or not a director or a majority shareholder breached a fiduciary duty
owed to a minority shareholder.' Those in control of a corporation owe
shareholders a duty to conduct business fairly and in good faith76 A transaction
that would violate the duties of good faith and fair dealing to the detriment of
a minority shareholder may trigger a remedy in dissolution.77
The South Carolina Court of Appeals inKiriakides v. Atlas Food Systems
& Services, Inc. 7' amalgamated numerous approaches to "oppression" and
created a broad standard by which South Carolina courts can judge oppressive
conduct. The court defined "oppressive" as:
(1) A visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and
a violation of fair play on which every shareholder who
entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely; or (2) A
breach of the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing; or
(3) Whether the reasonable expectations of the minority
shareholders have been frustrated by the actions of the
majority; or (4) A lack of probity and fair dealing in the
affairs of a company to the prejudice of some of its members;
or (5) A deprivation by majority shareholders of participation
71. See Thompson, supra note 70, at 712. See also Campbell, supra note 70, at 110
(discussing the role of reasonable expectations in Alabama case law); Sandra K. Miller, Should
the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majority Shareholders Exclude a Consideration of
Ethical Conduct and Business Purpose?, 97 DICK. L. REv. 227,232 (1993) (examining problems
with the reasonable expectations test); Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, What Amounts to
"Oppressive" Conduct Under Statue Authorizing Dissolution of Corporation at Suit ofMinority
Shareholders, 56 A.L.R.3d 358,362 (1974) (describing early use of the reasonable expectations
test).
72. See Campbell, supra note 70, at 110-11; Miller, supra note 71, at 251.
73. See Campbell, supra note 70, at 111; Miller, supra note 71, at 252.
74. Thompson, supra note 70, at 711. See also Tinio, supra note 71, § 3[a], at 363-67
(citing cases of "conduct consisting of a series of acts... preventing the minority ... from
participating effectively in managing or operating the corporation").
75. Thompson, supra note 70, at 712. See also Campbell, supra note 70, at 109 (citing
early "oppression" case law decided on the basis of fiduciary duty).
76. See S.C. CODEANN. § 33-8-300 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (prescribing general standards for
directors); Campbell, supra note 71, at 109; Thompson, supra note 70, at 712.
77. See Thompson, supra note 70, at 712.
78. No. 3107, 2000 WL 111521 (S.C. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2000).
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in management by minority shareholders. 9
Kiriakides involved a family-owned close corporation in which one
brother, defendant Alex Kiriakides, owned the majority of the corporation's
stock.8" The court held that Alex's exercise of corporate control was oppressive
to plaintiffs John and Louise Kiriakides, Alex's brother and sister."'
Specifically, the court named the following as evidence of oppressive conduct:
(1) the corporation's failure to pay dividends since 1990; (2) Alex's use of
majority power to overrule board decisions; (3) Alex's removal of John from
the office of corporate president; (4) the corporation's failure to notify John of
board meetings after Alex removed John from the office of president; (5) the
corporation's offerto purchase John's andLouise's interest at an extremely low
price relative to the corporation's value; and (6) the corporation's $17 million
expansion plan, which was unusually large for the corporation and probably
instituted "to permanently deprive John and Louise of any return on their
investment by diverting Atlas's assets to the expansion."82
Courts have become more willing to grant relief other than dissolution for
oppressive conduct.83 Indeed, oppression has now become an oft-used remedy
for mere shareholder dissension as opposed to a remedy resulting in dissolution
of a corporation.84 For example, in Hite v. Thomas & Howard Co.,8" the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant corporation's approval of a share exchange
oppressively reduced the plaintiff's proportional ownership in the corporation
by nearly one-third." However, the plaintiff did not seek dissolution, but
instead requested the court to compel the defendant to purchase the plaintiff's
shares for fair value. 7 The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
could bring an action on grounds of oppression without seeking dissolution.8
Thus, South Carolina recognizes an action for oppression separate from
79. Id. at *18.
80. Id. at*1-2.
81. Id. at * 17. The court determined that other fraudulent actions on the part of Alex alone
justified a buyout remedy for John and Louise, namely a decrease in Louise's shareholdings
resulting in an incorrectly low distribution to Louise in 1990 and the nondisclosure of
information relating to a stock divestiture in 1986. Id. at *10. Nonetheless, the court addressed
the issue of oppression. Id.
82. Id. at *10-18.
83. See Thompson, supra note 70, at 708.
84. Id. at 708-09.
85. 305 S.C. 358, 409 S.E.2d 340 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Huntley v.
Young, 319 S.C. 559,462 S.E.2d 860 (1995).
86. Id. at 361, 409 S.E.2d at 342.
87. Id. at364, 409 S.E.2d at343. See also S.C. CODEANN. § 33-14-3 10(d)(4) (Law. Co-op.
1976) (listing relief other than dissolution).
88. Hite, 305 S.C. at 364, 409 S.E.2d at 344. See also Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. &
Ser., Inc., 2000 WL 111521, at* 15 (allowing plaintiffshareholders to seekabuyouton grounds
of oppression as an alternative to dissolution). Close corporation shareholders have a statutory
right to petition for alternative relief. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-400(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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dissolution as a remedy for mere dissension.89
2. The LLC Context
An LLC member may petition for judicial dissolution under a mandatory
provision of the LLC Act that is almost identical to the corporate statute.90 In
contrast to most other control provisions in the LLC Act, the operating
agreement may not prevent the dissolution of an LLC once a court determines
that the LLC's actions are illegal or oppressive."
Courts presumably will interpret "oppressive" in the LLC context in the
same way that courts interpreted "oppressive" in the corporate context. The
question is how far courts are willing to stretch the oppression cause of action
for LLC members. The LLC Act does not expressly permit a court to order
relief other than dissolution, in contrast to the standard and close corporation
statutes. Without an express provision for alternative remedies, the LLC Act
may hinder the oppression cause of action from giving LLC members anything
but dissolution. Alternatively, a court may infer the authority to furnish
alternative relief based either on the court's inherent equity powers or the
substantial similarity between the corporate and LLC provisions. If a court can
order alternative relief, and if a court will allow an LLC member to petition
directly for alternative relief, then the oppression cause of action may evolve
into one of the most important control rights of an LLC minority member.9"
D. Preemptive Rights
1. The Corporate Context
A board's decision to issue new shares of a corporation is troublesome to
minority shareholders whose voting and equity participation rights will
diminish in relation to the voting and equity rights conferred upon the newly
issued shares. 93 To guard against the diluent effect of new stock, the Corporate
Code allows a shareholder to preempt the sale of new shares to third parties and
89. Hite, 305 S.C. at 364, 409 S.E.2d at 344; see also Thompson, supra note 70, at 709,
716 (suggesting that a shareholder's individual action for breach of fiduciary duty plus courts'
increased willingness to grant relief for oppression other than dissolution "merge to become the
oppression cause of action," which has evolved into a remedy for dissension).
90. An LLC member may seek dissolution if those in control of an LLC have acted "in a
manner thatis illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-44-801(4)(e) (West Supp. 1998). The LLC Act does not expressly permit an LLC
member to petition for dissolution on grounds of misappropriation, but "oppressive" may
arguably encompass misappropriation. Alternatively, misappropriation maygive rise to an action
for a breach of fiduciary duty. See id. § 33-44-409(b)(1), (d), (h)(2),
91. See id. § 33-44-103(b)(6).
92. See generally Hite v. Thomas & Howard Co., 305 S.C. 358, 409 S.E.2d 340 (1991),
overruled on other grounds by Huntley v. Young, 319 S.C. 559,462 S.E.2d 860 (1995).
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-6-300 cmt. (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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purchase a proportional quantity of the new stock.94 A shareholder has
preemptive rights to purchase any security that is "convertible into or [that
carries] a right to acquire voting shares." ' Contrary to other corporate control
provisions, preemptive rights are fully waivable eitherby a corporation through
its articles of incorporation or by a shareholder's individual waiver.96 If a
corporation's articles do not waive preemptive rights, then certain limits apply.
First, nonvoting shares "with preferential rights to distributions or assets," or
nonvoting preferred shares, have no preemptive rights.97 Nonvoting shares face
no risk of voting dilution. However, to the extent that a corporation gives
preferential rights to newly issued shares, a nonvoting preferred shareholder
has no protection against reduced equity participation rights.9" Second, a voting
shareholder without preferential rights may not preempt the issue of nonvoting
shares with preferential rights unless the newly issued stock is convertible into
voting shares.99
Further, the Corporate Code excepts from preemptive rights shares,
options, and convertible securities issued to compensate directors and corporate
employees.'0 ° Excluding compensatory securities potentially leaves room for
abuse because the board of directors typically determines its own compensation
and that of other corporate employees.' Although fiduciary duties owed by the
board may protect the minority to an extent, the board could distribute, as
wages, securities exempt from preemptive rights to squeeze out minority
shareholders.0 2 Finally, the Corporate Code excepts "shares sold otherwise
than for money," which gives the board authority to circumvent preemptive
rights based merely on the character of consideration received.0 3
2. The LLC Context
LLC members in South Carolina have no express preemptive rights.
94. See id. § 33-6-300(a), (b)(1). A shareholder may not preempt the sale of stock
authorized by the articles of incorporation if sold within the first six months of incorporation.
Id. § 33-6-300(b)(3)(iii). The price at which a corporation must offer shares preemptively must
be no higher than the prices offered to third parties. Id. § 33-6-300(b)(6). "A corporation
deciding to offer shares at a lower price must reoffer the shares preemptively to the shareholders
before selling them to third persons." Id. cmt.
95. Id. § 33-6-300 cmt (c).
96. Id. § 33-6-300(b)(2). A corporation may also choose to alter these statutory defaults.
Id. § 33-6-300(b). As a practical matter, a corporation probably will opt-out of the preemptive
rights statute. However, a corporation that avoids preemptive rights is still subject to fiduciary
duties when issuing additional shares. See generally id. § 33-8-300 (prescribing general
standards for directors).
97. Id. § 33-6-300(b)(4).
98. Id. § 33-6-300 cmt.
99. Id. § 33-6-300(b)(5).
100. Id. § 33-6-300(b)(3)(i)-(ii).
101. Seeid. §§ 33-8-101,-111.
102. See generally id. § 33-8-300 (prescribing general standards for directors).
103. Id. § 33-6-300(b)(3)(iv).
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However, the default provision of the LLC Act mandates that an LLC may not
admit a new member to the company without the consent of all existing
members. 4 Minority control over the admission of new members and the
corresponding reduction in a member's voting and equity rights is illusory,
however, because the operating agreement can either modify or opt out of the
unanimous vote requirement.' Thus, in the context of preemptive rights,
neither corporate shareholders nor LLC members in South Carolina enjoy any
mandatory statutory protection against the diluent effects of new membership
interests.
E. Transferee Voting Rights
1. The Corporate Context
Corporate stock is freely transferrable, subject only to share restrictions
imposed by a shareholder agreement or by a corporation's bylaws or articles
ofincorporation.'" A shareholder may wish to divest corporate shares for many
reasons, including oppressive actionby the boardprompting neither dissenter's
rights nor the right to petition for dissolution. The ease with which a
shareholder will find a willing buyer may depend, in part, upon the rights
transferred with the shareholder's interest.
The Corporate Code permits a shareholder to transfer the entire bundle of
rights associated with shares of stock, including the right to vote. 7 Free
transferability of a shareholder's voting rights theoretically serves to promote
share liquidity, which allows a dissatisfied shareholder to cash out of a
corporation more easily.'0 A transferee will be more willing to purchase shares
if the transferee can obtain some participatory rights in decisionmaking.
2. The LLC Context
In contrast, the LLC Act does not provide for the total and free
transferability of an LLC member's interest.'0 9 An LLC member may freely
transfer only the member's distributional interest, enabling a transferee to share
104. Id. § 33-44-404(c)(7) (West Supp. 1998).
105. See id. § 33-44-103.
106. See id. § 33-6-270 (Law. Co-op. 1976); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
§ 1.2.2, at 13 (1986). However, shares of a close corporation generally are not freely
transferrable. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-110(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976). A close corporation
shareholder may transfer the shareholder's interest only if either the corporation's articles of
incorporation permit a transfer or if the transfer falls into one of a few statutory exceptions. Id.
§ 33-18-110(b) (listing exceptions from the general transfer prohibition).
107. CLARK, supra note 106, § 1.2.2, at 14.
108. Id.
109. The assignability of an LLC interest closely resembles the transferability of a
partnership interest under the South Carolina Uniform Partnership Act. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 32-41-710 to -40 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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in the company's profits and all other distributions to which the transferor was
entitled." ° The LLC Act does not permit a member to transfer the member's
right to vote or the member's right to participate in management."' The LLC
Act's bifurcated approach to transferability significantly hinders the liquidity
ofamember's interestbecause buyers willrefuse, "at least without asignificant
discount, to accept the status of outside owner with financial but not
management or information rights.".. 2
A transferee may obtain voting rights only upon an LLC's approval."'
First, the operating agreement may provide t1at a member may transfer the
member's voting rights."' Second, if the operating agreement does not allow
a member to transfer the member's voting rights, LLC members may, by
unanimous vote, admit a transferee to membership in the LLC, giving the
transferee full voting rights."s
Therefore, an LLC member's interest is only as liquid as the company's
operating agreement allows. If the operating agreement either adopts the LLC
Act's statutory default or further lessens a transferee's rights, a minority LLC
member will have a difficult time finding a third party who is willing to
purchase the member's interest at fair value. However, if the operating
agreement allows amemberto transfer both the member's economic and voting
rights, then the operating agreement effectively creates a market for the
member's interest, allowing the member to sell the member's interest to a third
party for fair value.
F. Statutory Voting Rights for Nonvoting Shares
1. The Corporate Context
Nonvoting shareholders arguably have less control rights than minority
voting shareholders because nonvoting shares do not have the opportunity to
participate in corporate decision making. Although a corporation may designate
a class of shares as nonvoting in its articles of incorporation, the Corporate
Code mandates that even nonvoting shareholders may vote on certain
amendments to the articles of incorporation that would adversely affect the
110. Id. §§ 33-44-501(b),-502 (WestSupp. 1998). See also 1 PJBSTEIN&KEATINGE,supra
note 1, § 7.03, at 7-4 (stating that members may transfer only their rights to profits and
distributions). However, operating agreements commonly restrict the transfer of a member's
economic rights as well. TutrILL ETAL., supra note 52, § IV.C.l.a., at A-16.
111. S.C. CODEANN. § 33-44-502 (WestSupp. 1998); 1 RIBSTEIN&KEATNGE, supra note
1, § 7.03, at 7-4; TuTHILL ET AL., supra note 52, § IV.C.I.a, at A-15.
112. 1 RIBSTEN&KBATiNGE,supra note 1, § 7.04, at 7-6.
113. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-503(a) (West Supp. 1998).
114. Id. §§ 33-44-103, -501(c), -503(a)-(b) (allowing the operating agreement to provide
a transferee with voting rights upon admission as a member).
115. Id. §§ 33-44-503, -404(c)(7). The operating agreement may prescribe a lower vote to
admit a new member. See id. § 33-44-103(a).
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class of shares to which a nonvoting shareholder belongs." 6
Amendments that are potentially burdensome enough to occasion statutory
voting rights for a class of nonvoting shares are those that (1) alter the size,
rights, or preferences of a nonvoting class; (2) grant to another class rights or
preferences superior to those of a nonvoting class; or (3) reclassify shares either
into or out of the nonvoting class. "7 Dissenter's rights probably are available
to a nonvoting shareholder opposing the above amendments." 8
A class of nonvoting shareholders entitled to vote on a potentially adverse
articles amendment may vote as a separate voting group." 9 A voting group is
comprised of an entire class of shares authorized to vote on a transaction.
Instead of tabulating individual shareholder votes, the group's vote constitutes
one collective vote. 20 Voting as a separate voting group amplifies the statutory
right to vote on a matter. Where two or more voting groups are able to vote on
a matter, each group must approve the transaction. 2 ' The authority to prevent
an action in the wake of every other groups' approval by opposing the
transaction is a powerful control right for shareholders otherwise not entitled
to participate. Also, if a nonvoting group is unable to participate in a meeting
for lack of a group quorum, the corporation may not approve a transaction until
the nonvoting group endorses the transaction."
Nonvoting shareholders of a close corporation have additional statutory
voting rights. If a close corporation wishes to relinquish its close corporation
status, the corporation must do so by an articles amendment approved by two-
thirds of both voting and nonvoting shareholders." Also, nonvoting
shareholders of close corporations may vote to eliminate the board of directors,
to reinstate the board, and to obligate the corporation to purchase a
shareholder's interest upon the shareholder's death.'
Nonvoting shareholders in close corporations may also participate in
certain major transactions. First, a nonvoting shareholder may vote on a
116. Id. §§ 33-6-101(c)(1), -10-104(d) (Law. Co-op. 1976). A nonvoting shareholder may
also vote on and dissent from an amendment that would convert a corporation into a close
corporation. Id. § 33-18-103(b).
117. Id. § 33-10-104(a)(1)-(9).
118. See id. § 33-13-102(4) (West Supp. 1998).
119. Id. § 33-10-104(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
120. Id. § 33-1-400(27), cmt. 9. Generally, a majority of the votes cast within a voting
group determines the collective vote. Id. § 33-7-250(c).
121. Id. § 33-7-260(b). Any time nonvoting shareholders vote on articles amendments as
a separate voting group, at least two groups will vote on the matter because voting shares will
also vote as a group. See id. §§ 33-7-210(a), -10-103(f).
122. Id. § 33-7-260, cmt. A majority of group members present generally constitutes a
quorum, but the articles of incorporation may alter the number of shareholders necessary for a
quorum. Id. § 33-7-250(a). One voting group may have a quorum at a meeting, and thus be able
to vote, while another group may not. Id. § 33-7-260(b) cmt.
123. Id. § 33-18-31 0(a)-(b). A disapproving nonvoting shareholdermay dissent ifthe close
corporation adopts the amendment. Id. § 33-18-310(c).
124. Id. §§ 33-18-210(b), (d), -18-140(c).
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proposed merger if the merger would terminate the corporation's close
corporation status or if the surviving corporation would be a close
corporation.'25 Additionally, nonvoting close corporation shareholders may
vote on a sale of all, or substantially all, of the corporation's assets not made
in the ordinary course of business. 26 Because nonvoting shareholders in close
corporations may vote on a merger or a substantial asset disposition, nonvoting
shareholders of a close corporation may also dissent from the approval of these
transactions.'27
2. The LLC Context
The LLC Act apportions voting rights equally among LLC members. 2 '
However, an LLC can create various voting and preferential classes (similar to
the way that a corporation creates different shareholder classes) through its
operating agreement. 29 If the operating agreement creates a class of nonvoting
members, those nonvoting members have no concrete statutory voting rights.
The LLC Act appears to require the unanimous consent of an LLC's
members to approve certain maj or transactions, such as mergers and substantial
asset dispositions not made in the ordinary course of business. 3 ° However, by
creating a nonvoting class, the operating agreement trumps the LLC Act's
unanimous consent requirement, removing any statutory voting rights
nonvoting members may appear to have. A nonvoting LLC membership is
consequently less protected than its corporate counterpart because, without an
unwaivable statutory right to participate in fundamental transactions, a
nonvoting LLC member is absolutely vulnerable to majority discretion.'
G. Shareholder and Member Voting Rights
1. The Corporate Context
a. Classed Voting Shares
The Corporate Code as a default creates a straight voting scheme under
125. Id. § 33-18-300(a)(1), (2), cmt. These provisions are consistent with the notion that
nonvoting shareholders may vote on both the election and termination of close corporation
status. Id. § 33-18-300 cmt.
126. Id. § 33-18-300(b).
127. Id. § 33-13-102(1), (3) (West Supp. 1998) (giving shareholders who are entitled to
vote on mergers or substantial asset dispositions not made in the ordinary course of business
dissenter's rights), § 33-18-102 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (providing that general corporation
provisions of the Corporate Code apply to close corporations where not inconsistent with the
Close Corporation Supplement).
128. Id. § 33-44-404(a)(1), (b)(3)(i) (West Supp. 1998).
129. See id. § 33-44-103; TuTHILL ET AL., supra note 52, at A-17.
130. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-404(c) (West Supp. 1998).
131. Fiduciary duties imposed on LLC management would still protect a nonvoting LLC
member. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
2000
19
Bumgardt: Control Provisions of the South Carolina Code: Corporations Versu
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
which each voting shareholder may cast one vote per share "on each matter
voted on at a shareholders' meeting."' Straight voting effectively denies
minority shareholders the right to select directors because majority shareholders
generally control the plurality of votes necessary to elect directors.' As an
alternative to straight voting and as a means of distributing corporate control,
a corporation may divide its shareholders into separate classes, allocating to
one or more classes the right to elect one or more directors.'34 As a result, a
corporation may authorize a class of minority shareholders to elect one or more
directors, securing at least some minority representation in corporate decision-
making.
35
However, classed voting is neither a mandatory nor a default provision of
the Corporate Code. A corporation must specifically opt to provide for classed
voting shares in its articles of incorporation. 136 Consequently, unless the
minority can convince majority shareholders to provide for classed voting
shares in the initial articles of incorporation, minority shareholders need
majority consent to amend the articles and enact classed voting. 37 Thus the
protection afforded by classed voting shares is largely dependent on the
majority's willingness to effect it.
b. Cumulative Voting for Directors
Another voting protection of the Corporate Code designed to offset the
principle of majority rule is cumulative voting for directors. Cumulative voting
gives shareholders the statutory right to concentrate the total number of a
shareholder's votes in favor of one or a few candidates.'38
To detennine a shareholder's cumulative voting capacity, a shareholder
must "multiply the number of votes [she is] entitled to cast by the number of
directors for whom [she is] entitled to vote."'39 For example, in an election to
132. S.C. CODEANN. § 33-7-210(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
133. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. A corporation may require more than a
majority vote to elect board members (or to approve any other shareholder or board action) in
its articles of incorporation. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-270(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976). A
"supermajority" voting provision protects minority shareholders because any action calling for
an approval greater than a majority necessitates some minority support. 2 SHERWOOD M.
CLEVELANDETAL., S.C. CORP.PRAC.MANUAL § 6.05[2]; LARRYD. SODERQuiST&A.A. SOMMER,
JR., UNDERSTANDING CORPORATION LAW 220 (1990).
134. See S.C. CODEANN. § 33-8-104 (Law. Co-op. 1976) ("the articles may also authorize
the election of all or a specified number of directors by the holders of one or more authorized
classes of shares"); see also id. § 33-6-101 (allowing a corporation to create various classes of
shares). A majority vote within each class determines the collective class vote. Id. §§ 33-8-104
cmt, -7-250(c).
135. See id. § 33-8-104 cmt. A corporation may similarly allocate voting rights by class
for other matters as well. See id. § 33-6-101; 2 CLEVELAND ETAL., supra note 133, § 6.05[1].
136. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-6-101, -8-104 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
137. See generally note 40 and accompanying text.
138. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-280(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976). A shareholder may not vote
cumulatively unless either the meeting notice or the shareholder gives the requisite notice. Id.
§ 33-7-280(c).
139. Id. § 33-7-280(b).
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fill five board openings, a shareholder with ten shares would have fifty total
votes to distribute among the candidates; the shareholder may either vote fifty
times for one candidate or spread the fifty votes between the candidates. 4 The
fewer candidates over which the shareholder spreads her votes, the more likely
it is that the shareholder's candidates will win.
Thus, cumulative voting enables minority shareholders to compete with the
majority vote and "secure representation on the board of directors,''.
especially if minority shareholders agree to vote together in favor of a
particular candidate. 42 The more board positions that a corporation must fill,
the more valuable cumulative voting becomes to minority shareholders. 43 For
every additional vacancy on the board, the minority vote in favor ofa particular
candidate becomes stronger and, especially if the majority fails to cumulate its
votes, the likelihood of a minority-elected candidate increases.'"
Cumulative voting is a default provision of the Corporate Code.'45 A
corporation may disallow cumulative voting by so providing in its articles of
incorporation, which generally requires only a majority vote.'" As a practical
matter, most corporations probably eliminate cumulative voting. Thus,
cumulative voting protects minority shareholders only where the majority
allows cumulative voting to protect minority shareholders.
c. Voting Agreements and Voting Trusts
The Corporate Code expressly permits two additional mechanisms through
which minority shareholders can pool a collective vote: the voting agreement
and the voting trust.47 In a voting agreement, minority shareholders agree to
vote their shares together in order to "maximize the group's voting power."'
' 4
By contractually concentrating the minority vote, minority shareholders
theoretically could approve a transaction or elect a candidate to the board of
directors despite the majority shareholders' disapproval.
Parties to the contract determine how to enforce the agreement. 49 For
example, the parties could appoint a proxy to vote all shares subject to the
140. See id.; 2 JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 13.21, at 13.45 (Supp. 1999).
Without cumulative voting, the shareholder may cast a maximum often votes for each vacancy.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-210(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
141. 2 Cox, supra note 140, § 13.21, at 13.45.
142. See id. at 13.45-.46.
143. Id. at 13.46.
144. See id. at 13.45-.46.
145. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-280(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
146. See id.; See also supra note 40and accompanying text.
147. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 33-7-300, -310 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
148. 2 CLEVELAND ET AL., supra note 133, at 6-10; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-310(a)
(Law. Co-op. 1976).
149. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-3 10 cmt. (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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contract.150 A party to a voting agreement enforced through proxies statutorily
cannot revoke the party's proxy.' Additionally, even if parties do not use
proxies to enforce the contract, voting agreements are specifically enforceable,
and a court can compel either party to vote in accordance with the agreement.'52
Minority shareholders may alternatively create a voting trust in order to
pool the minority vote. To create a voting trust, shareholders convey their
shares to a trustee, who then has the authority to vote the shares in any way the
trustee sees fit.'53 Centralizing the minority votes in trust helps ensure that the
votes will be cast together in much the same way as the voting agreement.
However, unlike the potentially perpetual voting agreement, the Corporate
Code limits the duration of a voting trust to ten years. t 4 Parties to the trust may
extend the trust for additional ten year periods.'55 Further, parties to a voting
trust must file with the corporation the trust agreement and a list detailing each
beneficial owner's name, address, and trust interest.
156
2. The LLC Context
a. Classed Voting
The default voting apportionment under the LLC Act is more protective
than that of the Corporate Code. The LLC Act allots one vote to each LLC
member regardless of the member's contribution. 57 One vote per member
results in an equality among LLC members similar to that created by voting
groups in the corporate context. 58 Theoretically, no member's vote is more
influential than another member's vote. But if enough members commonly vote
together, outvoting the remaining members, then the principle ofmajority rule
emerges despite the heightened default voting protection.
In response, members theoretically may establish classed voting through
the operating agreement, although the LLC Act does not specifically authorize
its creation. A manager-managed LLC could utilize classed voting to give
150. Id. A "proxy" is both an agent authorized by a shareholder to vote for the shareholder
and the agent's authorization to vote for the shareholder. See id. § 33-7-220 cmt. 2; 2 COXETAL.,
supra note 140, § 13.22, at 13.49.
151. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-220(d)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
152. Id. § 33-7-310(b); 2 CLEVELAND ETAL., supra note 133, § 6.061l].
153. See S.C. CODEANN. § 33-7-300(a), (d) (Law. Co-op. 1976); 2 COXETAL.,supra note
140, § 13.32, at 13.84. The trust agreement should outline the trustee's voting authority. 2
CLEVELAND ETAL., supra note 133, § 6.06[1], at 6-11. The trustee is subject to fiduciary duties
when voting the trust shares. 2 COX ET AL., supra note 140, § 13.32, at 13.84.
154. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-300(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
155. Id. § 33-7-300(c).
156. Id. § 33-7-300(a).
157. Id. § 33-44-404(a)(1), (b)(3)(i) (West Supp. 1998). The operating agreement may
modify the LLC Act's voting power allocation, and indeed most LLCs allocate voting authority
according to member contributions. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
158. See generally supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
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certain members or groups of members the exclusive right to elect one or more
managers. In a member-managed LLC where each member would constitute
a separate class, a classed voting scheme would be redundant because of the
statutory default. Classed voting would serve to allocate to each member an
equal vote in management-aprotection already provided to each member under
the LLC Act's default voting apportionment.5 9 However, where multiple
minority members create one or more classes together, especially where the
operating agreement has altered the LLC Act's voting apportionment, classed
voting may be an effective mechanism through which to concentrate and
channel the minority vote.
LLC members face a problem similar to that of corporate shareholders in
creating a classed voting scheme-majority approval. Adding aprovision to the
operating agreement either in the initial organization orby amendment requires
the consent ofmajority members. 6 ' Thus, although classedvoting is apotential
control mechanism, minority LLC members will be able to benefit from its
protection only if majority members consent.
b. Cumulative Voting in a AIanager-Managed LLC
The LLC Act contains no provisions regarding cumulative voting.
Although a member of a manager-managed LLC' 6' theoretically could bargain
for the inclusion of a cumulative voting provision in the operating agreement,
majority members are not likely to give the consent necessary to enact
cumulative voting because cumulative voting means potentially less power for
the majority. Thus, despite the Corporate Code's inclusion of cumulative voting
as a default provision, both minority shareholders and minority LLC members
again must depend on majority approval for cumulative voting protection.
c. Voting Agreements and Voting Trusts
The LLC Act addresses neither voting agreements nor voting trusts.
Presumably, LLC members are free to enter at least a voting agreement.
Minority LLC members can use a voting agreement to pool a collective and
thus more significant vote in the same manner as minority shareholders. Unlike
the Corporate Code, however, the LLC Act contains no provision making
voting agreements specifically enforceable. Thus, where the Corporate Code
ensures minority shareholders that parties to a voting agreement cannot renege
and vote outside the terms of the contract, the LLC Act by silence may permit
159. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
160. See S.C. CODEANN. § 33-44-404(c)(1) (West Supp. 1998). The operating agreement
may change the minimum votes necessary to amend the operating agreement. See id. § 33-44-
103.
161. Cumulative voting is appropriate only for manager-managed LLCs because its
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a party to vote in violation of a voting agreement. 162 However, a party who
votes in violation of a voting agreement still may be liable in damages for
breach of contract. A voting agreement is not effective if parties to the contract
cannot force each other to vote according to the agreement. The more parties
that withdraw from avoting agreement, the less concentrated and influential the
remaining contractual pool becomes. Consequently, the LLC Act's failure to
rendervoting agreements specifically enforceable makes the Corporate Code's
regulation of voting agreements more protective.
Whether or not LLC members are free to form a voting trust is
questionable. The LLC Act does not address voting trusts, but the LLC Act
does significantly restrict the voting rights of an assignee. 163 If a trustee is
treated as an assignee, the trustee would be unable to vote unless the particular
LLC allowed transferees to vote.1' A trustee's inability to vote would render
the voting trust worthless to minority LLC members. However, if a trustee is
not considered an assignee, a voting trust may be available in the LLC context.
III. CONCLUSION
The principle of majority rule is disadvantageous to both minority and
nonvoting corporate shareholders and LLC members. The South Carolina
Corporate Code attempts to mitigate the potential for oppression by those in
control of a corporation by providing corporate shareholders with a number of
non-waivable control rights. In the LLC context, however, the relatively few
control rights found in the LLC Act are illusory. In effect, by according such
an enormous amount of discretion to the operating agreement, the LLC Act
provides autonomy to each LLC to either provide or fail to provide control
rights to its members. Thus the control provisions of the LLC Act are
unprotective and irrelevant to minority and nonvoting LLC members unless the
operating agreement otherwise provides. Lawyers counseling clients to
organize either as a corporation or an LLC must be wary of the gulf between
the statutory protections afforded minority shareholders and minority LLC
members under South Carolina law.
Thomas Alexander Brumgardt
162. Parties may enforce the contract by executing proxies, arguably making the proxies
irrevocable. See 2 Cox ET AL., supra note 140, § 13.23, at 13.52-1 ("A proxy... is revocable
unless 'coupled with an interest."'). See generally supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text
(discussing proxies). If the proxies are irrevocable, then a party to a voting agreement will be
unable to withdraw from the appointed agent the authority to vote the party's shares.
163. See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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